Q:Is intuition a valid tool for investigating morality?
To clarify, I mean valid as in relevant and useful, not like the term used in logic.
My desire for universalisation on the one hand tends to support the usefulness of intuition and on the other really want to deny its usefulness. While there are moral claims that we can come to a near consensus on almost universally, it's still slippery. Where do these intuitions even come from? Where is the solid basis for morality?
My intuition (see what I did there?) is that these moral intuitions, that 'yuck' at the sight of a 'wrongness,' is a consequence of ingrained moral systems rather than some independent a priori sort of pointer to what morality is. Strangling mothers is a particularly bad crime because we agree that we should respect, love and protect our mothers.
Fundamentally, morality is only created out of consensus, and while I really want to banish relativism, I don't see how morality-as-consensus can be challenged. Maybe there is room to challenge another's moral beliefs not because they're 'wrong' but because it is consistent with your beliefs to challenge the others beliefs for not being consistent with your own.
To clarify, I mean valid as in relevant and useful, not like the term used in logic.
My desire for universalisation on the one hand tends to support the usefulness of intuition and on the other really want to deny its usefulness. While there are moral claims that we can come to a near consensus on almost universally, it's still slippery. Where do these intuitions even come from? Where is the solid basis for morality?
My intuition (see what I did there?) is that these moral intuitions, that 'yuck' at the sight of a 'wrongness,' is a consequence of ingrained moral systems rather than some independent a priori sort of pointer to what morality is. Strangling mothers is a particularly bad crime because we agree that we should respect, love and protect our mothers.
Fundamentally, morality is only created out of consensus, and while I really want to banish relativism, I don't see how morality-as-consensus can be challenged. Maybe there is room to challenge another's moral beliefs not because they're 'wrong' but because it is consistent with your beliefs to challenge the others beliefs for not being consistent with your own.
I think intuition is certainly a relevant tool for investigating morality. I think that, in general, our intuitions are decently in line with morality. However, I think that placing a value on things that you intuit is a bad idea. That is, it is a bad idea to say thus: since I intuit that killing parrots is wrong, it must be so that killing parrots is wrong. I think that we ought to defend our ideas with reasons almost regardless of our intuitions, and we especially ought to do so if our intuition differ from those of anyone else.
ReplyDeleteOur intuition sometimes lead us to think questionable things. For example, many people intuit that killing is worse than letting someone die if you have the full capacity to stop that death. This intuition is wrong; all things being equal, killing and letting die are equally immoral.
Also, even if intuitions happen to be correct, I am not sure what we gain from expressing intuitions as feelings. Expressing thoughts as feelings tends to give a sense that those thoughts are less important because they are subjective and really only what a person feels. It's the difference between "I feel like murder is wrong" and "I think murder is wrong." The voice of the former is saying "I feel like it's wrong, but it's just my feeling so.... I mean, I guess, maybe, if you want, you could, if you could, feel the same way." The voice of the latter is saying "I think this is wrong. I have reasons to think so. If you think differently, we should talk this out."
Ideally, when someone challenges a thought, the other person is pressed to give reasons, or at least to try giving reasons. Often, when someone challenges intuitions, the other person simply claims that it's just a feeling and people can feel what feel, people should leave others alone.
This, I think, is the basis for stylistic checklist item number 20 on the Philosophy department's Writing Checklist - they explain it pretty well there. [http://www.dkjsmclahandouts.blogspot.com/2010/01/style-checklist.html].
But where do intuitions come from that they can be considered relevant to moral philosophy?
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