Q & A Five Question Two

How do we deal with time being infinitely divisible?

I'm really tempted to solve this simply by saying that time is not infinitely divisible. That it is infact divided into incredibly small discrete moments. If there are discrete moments then causal relations can't happen during insanely small periods of time.

According to the block theory, which is the most convincing by far, I think that time's smallest discrete units of measurement is the smallest amount of time that an action can happen in. This assumes that actions don't happen at a certain level of time, but it does seem that, at least on our scale of space-time, that all actions are limited in speed. Perceivable action can only happen in this certain limit of fastness and slowness, and assuming there was no limit we might see actions happening in an infinite variety of speeds.

The above idea does not really solve the problem of time being infinitely divisible, but it does mean that there is a level past which it is no longer useful to measure units of time, therefore creating at least some sort of stopgap basic unit of time.

Q & A Five Question One

How does determinism relate to the block theory of time?

It seems that if every action is the direct result of the action before it, and so on into the future and past of causal relationships, all things are determined to happen. This seems to fit in very nicely with the block theory of time. 

To use the block theory one might necessarily have to be a determinist, but simply viewing this theory of time using determinism one would see that causal relations have much to do with how time seems to work. A moment is a theoretical frozen unit of time with the result of all the causal relations before it and after it all the causes of that moment arrayed ahead in the future. Time more acts like a dimension of space, where you can specify a place in time the same way you can specify a point in space.

Free will does not seem to be compatible with the block theory. If free will or some other unforeseen randomness could be proved then we would have more ground to disregard this theory of time.